Sunday, March 29, 2009
Belated reservations about 'objet petit a'
There hasn't been much talk about the objet petit a in class in the last bunch of weeks, but previous to that I was finding it a little troubling how easily applied the concept could be. It seemed as though anything we're typically attracted to or afraid of or interested in could be labeled an objet petit a. But if the application of the concept really is that unconstrained, then it's not a very useful concept at all; it can't possibly be telling you very much (beyond that the thing is something we fear/want/are interested in).
I feel like the concept picks out a really interesting and important sort of existential/psychological issue—but left as loosely specified as it is, it seems too unconstrained to really tell you much about the world. My biggest problem with theorists like Zizek is that they paint a very pretty picture and do lots of engaging interpretation, but it's never made clear how their notions could be disproved, or what the limits on their theoretical scheme are. If Zizek could use his theory to provide an artful explanation for the fact that X occurred, but could provide an equally artful explanation of ~X, then his theory is too unconstrained in that case to tell you anything about X, or perhaps is better looked at as a sort of literary device. (In our reading, at least, he seems to dither indecisively between trying to show how reality itself reflects his scheme, and showing that our perceptions of reality fit into it.)
This would only not be a problem (and I'm in no position to say if it really is or isn't for Zizek) if the theoretical scheme was, under the surface, very precise about how exactly the Real behaves, how to show something isn't a manifestation of it, etc.
My feeling is that human psychology must unavoidably be more complex than one single overarching conceptual scheme like this could capture, however appealing the general scheme is on the broad scale.
I feel like the concept picks out a really interesting and important sort of existential/psychological issue—but left as loosely specified as it is, it seems too unconstrained to really tell you much about the world. My biggest problem with theorists like Zizek is that they paint a very pretty picture and do lots of engaging interpretation, but it's never made clear how their notions could be disproved, or what the limits on their theoretical scheme are. If Zizek could use his theory to provide an artful explanation for the fact that X occurred, but could provide an equally artful explanation of ~X, then his theory is too unconstrained in that case to tell you anything about X, or perhaps is better looked at as a sort of literary device. (In our reading, at least, he seems to dither indecisively between trying to show how reality itself reflects his scheme, and showing that our perceptions of reality fit into it.)
This would only not be a problem (and I'm in no position to say if it really is or isn't for Zizek) if the theoretical scheme was, under the surface, very precise about how exactly the Real behaves, how to show something isn't a manifestation of it, etc.
My feeling is that human psychology must unavoidably be more complex than one single overarching conceptual scheme like this could capture, however appealing the general scheme is on the broad scale.
# posted by David Rusak @ 7:26 PM 
